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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the association between stock prices and discretionary accruals in different 
stock market cycles and presents evidence about the discrepancy in prior research that investors 
were able to identify earnings management in some cases, but not in some other cases. We argue 
that investors’ reaction to the true nature of EPS changes may be different in different market 
cycles. We suggests that investors pay less attention to the nature of EPS changes in an optimistic 
cycle, and are more critical in neutral and pessimistic cycles. Therefore, investors are more likely 
to detect and count for any earnings management in a neutral or pessimistic cycle than in an 
optimistic cycle. Using the U.S. quarterly data from July 01, 1997 to June 29, 2001, three market 
cycles were identified: optimistic, neutral and pessimistic. The test results indicated that the 
association between discretionary accruals and abnormal stock returns were insignificant in the 
neutral market cycle, significant and positive in the optimistic cycle and significant and negative 
in the pessimistic cycle. These findings indicate that investors tend to ignore the income-
increasing effect of discretionary accruals on EPS changes in an optimistic market. The finding 
suggests that a more delegate and technical analysis of EPS changes is required when earnings 
information is used for stock pricing. It also suggests that a consideration of market cycle effect on 
investors’ use of EPS could improve the earnings-based ratio analysis. The findings propose that 
researchers interested in investigating the association between stock prices and earnings 
management should control for the effect of the market cycle during which their samples are 
drawn.  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
rior research on earnings management’s ability to push up stock prices in several situations has been 
mixed at best. Some studies have found that earnings management can push up stock prices (see, 
e.g.Yongtae and Myung, 2005; Fischer and Stocken, 2004; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). To the 
contrary, other studies have found that investors were able to find about the true nature of changes in earnings per 
share (EPS) and discounted the effect of opportunistic earnings management in the stock prices (e.g. Siew, Welch 
and Wong, 1998; Rangan, 1998; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000). The interesting 
question that emerges is why investors were able to identify the earnings management in some cases, but not in 
others. This study addresses this issue by investigating the effect of stock market cycles on investors’ use of EPS 
information. As earnings management often take place through the inflation of discretionary accruals, we investigate 
whether different market cycles affect investors’ reaction to discretionary accruals. We define market cycles as 
optimistic, neutral and pessimistic. Optimistic market cycle is referred to the situation in which investors are 
optimistic about future economy and stock prices are increasing in general. Neutral market cycle refers to the 
situation when there is no emotional market environment and investors evaluate the economic information including 
EPS changes analytically. Pessimistic market cycle exists when a price reevaluation began across the board and 
current prices are seen too overstated. Market will go through price correction in this cycle and the corporate and 
national economy fundamentals do not seem to support the current prices. Investors become critic about the 
management actions and evaluate the information about companies and the economy critically. 
P 
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Investors are more likely to pay less attention to the true nature of earnings changes in an optimistic market 
cycle because investors tend to receive the increases in EPS positively and are generally optimistic about 
management actions and its ambitious business plans. This phenomenon presents an opportunity for earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. In addition, the market positive trend in an optimistic cycle attracts 
more unsophisticated and inexperienced investors who are likely to fail to understand the true nature of changes in 
EPS. This study contributes to the literature by improving our understanding of when investors are likely to identify 
managed earnings and when they are less likely. Findings from this study should help future researchers as well as 
financial analysts improve their analysis by controlling the effect of market cycles on investors’ use of EPS 
information and their reaction to earnings management.  
 
This paper continues as follows: section two presents literature review and hypothesis development. 
Section three describes methodology. Section four presents test results. Section five explains summary and 
discussion.  
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior studies present evidence of opportunistic earnings manipulation for various situations. A line of 
research investigated earnings manipulation in the case of equity offering and documented that firms used income-
increasing accruals before a seasoned equity offering to inflate earnings numbers (e.g Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan 
1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Yongtae and Myung, 2005). Similar pattern was found for 
the case of initial public offering firms (e.g. Li and McConomy, 2004; Ducharme, Malatesta and Sefcik, 2004) and 
for the case of stock financial acquisitions (e.g. Erickson and Wang, 1998; Louis, 2004; Heron and Lie, 2002).  
 
Another line of research investigated earnings manipulation in the cases of meeting financial analysts’ 
forecasts. These studies found that management engaged in earnings manipulation to meet the expectations and 
avoid reporting earnings lower than analysts’ expectations (e.g. Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005, Lacina and Karim, 2004). Similar findings are reported in Abarbanell and Lehavy (1998) that find firms 
receiving buy recommendations from analysts are more likely to manage their earnings to meet analysts’ earnings 
expectations. Prior studies also presented evidence that firms engaged in earnings management to avoid reporting 
EPS lower than management earnings forecasts (e.g. Kasznik, 1999; Karamanou and Vafcas, 2005; Ajinkya, Bhojraj 
and Sengupta, 2005). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found that firms manage their reported earnings to avoid 
earnings decreases and losses. They found that there are unusually lower frequencies of small decreases in earnings 
and small losses, and unusually higher frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) also found that firms manage their earnings upward which are falling just short of thresholds.  
 
While prior studies present useful insight about the situations in which firms are likely to manage their 
earnings, there are only few studies that addressed the situation in which a firm’s ability to engage in earnings 
management is restricted. Investigation of factors that restrict the management’s ability to engage in earnings 
management is important because it will help us to understand the process of engaging in earnings management by 
firms rather than the evidence of earnings management. For example, Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) found that 
different firms use different accrual items to manage their earnings for different purposes. Also, Barton and Simko 
(2002) found that earnings management in the following periods is limited by type and extent of use of the accruals 
which were used in the preceding periods because of the effect of accruals reversion. Detection likelihood is another 
factor that has been found effective on the management ability to engage in earnings management. Ducharmeet at al. 
(2004) found that the magnitude of unexpected accruals is positively associated with probability of shareholder 
litigation against stock issuing firms. Beneish (1999) found that large increases in total accruals were associated with 
the probability of being the target of SEC enforcement action. Another limiting factor investigated by prior studies is 
perceived earnings quality (Leuz, Nanda and Wrysocki, 2003). They found that undetected earnings management 
could impact negatively the perceived earnings quality by shareholders if the earnings management results in higher 
gap between earnings and cash flow.  
 
Research, however, in the area of the situation in which firms are likely (unlikely) to engage in earnings 
management is in early step and further studies are needed to explore other factors that may affect the process of 
engaging in earnings management. The current study contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of stock 
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market cycles on the likelihood of engaging in earnings management. The investigation of the effect of market 
cycles is important as prior studies found that economic conditions such as economic cycles are effective on 
corporate decision for executive performance evaluation and their compensation structure (e.g. Matolcsy, 2000).  
 
Different market cycles could influence the incentive for engaging in earnings management by affecting 
shareholders’ emotional reaction to earnings changes. In an optimistic market cycle, investors are less likely to 
investigate the true nature of changes in earnings due to market positive environment and also the existence of naive 
investors in the market. The market high returns attract many naive investors who may not be able to investigate the 
true nature of EPS changes. Thus, the likelihood of being detected or questioned about accrual changes is lower in 
this cycle and consequently the potential cost of earnings management is lower. However, the market environment is 
different in a neutral cycle and there are no investors’ emotional reactions to earnings changes. Investors analyze the 
management actions analytically, especially for financial reporting policies. In addition, there are fewer naive 
investors in the market because of lack of large stock returns in the short-time which are usually seen in an 
optimistic market cycle. In this case, investors are likely to detect the managed portion of earnings and discount it in 
the prices. On the other hand, a pessimistic market cycle could affect the cost and likelihood of earnings 
management differently. In a pessimistic cycle investors are critical of management actions, especially financial 
reporting due to general negative market environment. Thus, investors’ reaction to earnings management would be 
negative, which means investors may reduce the stock price of the firms that report increases in discretionary 
accruals. In addition, the impact of negative news is higher than the effect of good news in this cycle. According to 
our discussion, we define the following three hypotheses: 
 
Ha:  Increases in discretionary accruals are positively associated with increases in unexpected stock returns in an 
optimistic market cycle.  
Hb:   Increases in discretionary accruals are not significantly associated with unexpected stock returns in a 
neutral market environment.  
Hc:  Increases in discretionary accruals are associated with negative unexpected stock returns in a pessimistic 
market environment.   
 
III.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Time Period And Data 
 
The period of the third quarter of 1998 to the end of the first quarter of 2000 is selected as an optimistic 
market cycle. In this period, major stock market indexes rose significantly as presented in panel B of Table 1. It 
shows that the market breath was generally positive and stock prices rose across the board during this period. Dow 
Jones Industrials (DJI) rose 43%, NASDAQ rose 259% and S&P500 rose 52%. However, such optimism did not 
exist in a similar period before and after the optimistic cycle. We selected five quarters before the optimistic cycle as 
neutral market cycle. During this period, DJI rose only 1.5%, NASDAQ rose 41% and S&P500 rose 14%, which are 
consistent with normal market returns (Table 1, Panel A). The NASDAQ increase of 41% is also normal because 
this market was hit by a new wave of IPO companies during that period. We chose five quarters after the optimistic 
cycle as pessimistic cycle. During this period DJI lost 6.4%, NASAQ lost 55% and S&P500 lost 19% (Table 1, 
Panel C). The magnetite of the losses indicates that investors became very critic during this period and price 
corrections started across the board. We used quarterly data because quarterly earnings news has been the most 
important piece of information for stock price evaluation and it allows us to investigate earnings management on a 
quarterly basis.  
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Table 1 
Market Trend During The Period Of January 01, 1999 To March 31, 2000 
 
Panel A: Change in the major indexes during neutral cycle  
 
Index  July 01, 97 Sep 30, 98 Change            % of change        
DJI     7722     7842     120             1.5% 
NASDAQ    953     1345     392             41% 
S&P 500     891     1017     126             14% 
 
Panel B: Change in the major indexes during optimistic cycle 
 
Index  Oct 01, 98 Mar 31, 00  Change            % of change        
DJI     7632     10921     3289              43% 
NASDAQ    1273         4572     3299              259% 
S&P 500     986     1498     512              52% 
 
Panel C: Change in the major indexes during pessimistic cycle 
 
Index  April 03, 00 June 29, 01 Change            % of change        
DJI     11221     10502     -719            - 6.4% 
NASDAQ    4077     1832     -2245            - 55% 
S&P 500     1505     1224     -281            - 19% 
 
 
Discretionary Accruals 
 
Firms may manipulate their earnings in different ways. It can be done by manipulating specific items such 
as manipulating accounts receivable (Beneish, 1997), bad-debt expense (McNichols and Wilson, 1988) and loan 
losses (Beaver and Engel (1996). Also, the manipulation can be done using total accruals which are non-cash items 
and could have increasing or decreasing effect on net income. While first approach investigates how a specific 
accounting item could be used to manipulate earnings, the second approach investigates the collective effect of 
accrual items on the reported earnings.  
 
We use the second approach in this paper as our objective is to investigate earnings management in general 
without referring to a particular item. Accordingly, we calculate total accruals for firm i in quarter t as follows: 
 
TACit = (CAit - Cashit) – (CLit – CPLit) – DEPit                     (1) 
 
where TACit is total accruals, CAit is total current assets, Cash is total cash and equivalent, CLit is total current 
liabilities, CPLit is total current portion of long term debt and DEPit is depreciation expense.  indicates change in 
the respective variable. 
 
TACit includes both portions of non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Accordingly, discretionary accruals are 
computed as follows: 
 
DACit = TACit – NDACit                                             (2) 
 
Where DACit is discretionary accruals for firm i in quarter t and TACit is total accruals reported by firm i in the same 
quarter. NDACit is non-discretionary accruals.  
 
In the absence of earnings management, the mean of DACit should be zero during this test period. A non-
zero and positive mean of discretionary accruals indicates the use of accruals to overstate earnings. Non-
discretionary accruals are estimated using modified Jones model. This model has been found more appropriate than 
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other existing models in capturing non-discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). We used the following model to 
estimate non-discretionary accruals: 
 
NDACit/TAi,t-1 = 1(1/TAi,t-1) + 2(NREVi,t/TAit-1) + 3(PPEit/TAi,t-1)                    (3) 
 
where NDACit non-discretionary accruals, TAi,t-1 is total assets, NREVi,t is total revenue net of receivables, PPEi,t is 
total plant, property and equipment and  is the respective coefficient. The model parameters, 1, 2 and 3, are 
estimated using an OLS regression.  
 
Sample Selection 
 
Initial samples were obtained from Compustat. We required that firms must have at least 25 necessary data 
to compute model 3 for the period of the first quarter of 1990 to the end of the third quarter of 1998. This procedure 
resulted in a sample of 1509 firms. Table 3 presents the breakdown of the sample based on industry membership and 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
 
 
Table 2 
Industry Classification Of Sample Firms 
 
                                                                                                                           Number of Firms 
 
Basic Industries     115 
Capital Goods     385 
Construction      44 
Consumer Goods     813 
Energy      110 
Finance       42  
Total       1509 
                                                                      ==== 
 
The following approach is used to classify the samples into the different industries: 
 
 
Basic Industries: 1000-1299, 1400-1499, 2600-2699, 2800-2829, 2870- 2899, 3300-3399. 
 
Capital Goods: 3400-3419, 3440-3599, 3620-3629, 3670-3699, 3800-3849, 5080-5089, 5100-5129, 
5160-5169, 7300-7399. 
 
Construction: 1500-1999, 2400-2499, 3220-3299, 3430-3439, 5200-5219. 
 
Consumer Goods: 0000-0999, 2000-2399, 2500-2599, 2700-2799, 2830-2869, 3000-3219, 3420-3429, 
3600-3619, 3630-3669, 3700-3719, 3850-3899, 3900-3999, 4830-4899, 5000-5079, 
5090-5099, 5130-5159, 5180-5199, 5220-5999, 7000-7299, 7400-9999. 
Energy:  1300-1399, 2900-2999, 5170-5179. 
 
Finance:  6000-6999. 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Breakdown of discretionary accruals by period: 
    
Market cycle  Mean  SD 
Neutral  .0202  1.212 
Optimistic    .0595  1.239 
Pessimistic                -.0121           .374 
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Table 2 shows that the sample is distributed across industries considering the size of each industry. Table 3 
shows that the means of discretionary accruals. The negative mean in the pessimistic cycle indicates the mean 
reversion of accruals.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
We use the following model to test the hypotheses:  
 
ARit = ß0 + ß1DTACit                                (6) 
 
where ARit is unexpected stock returns and DTACit is discretionary accruals. 
 
Investors’ reaction to charges in discretionary accruals in each market cycle is tested as follows:  
 
If ß1 = 0   no investors’ reaction 
If ß1 > 0   positive reaction 
If ß1 < 0   negative reaction 
 
We calculated unexpected stock returns using the market model and used S&P 500 as the market proxy. 
 
IV.  TEST RESULTS 
   
The test results are presented in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4 
Regression Test Results 
 
Market Cycles  ß0 t-value ß1 t-value 
Neutral 1.76   8.450     .157      .917 
Optimistic 2.033 11.118 .148 2.864 
Pessimistic .913 4.143 -.971 -1.650  
 
 
Table 4 shows that β1 is insignificant for the neutral cycle which indicates that increases in discretionary 
accruals were not associated with higher unexpected stock returns. These findings present support for hypothesis 
one and suggest that investors detected abnormal changes in discretionary accruals and discounted them in the stock 
prices. Table 4 shows that the coefficient is positive and significant for the optimistic cycle indicating that increases 
in discretionary accruals were associated with higher unexpected stock returns. The findings present support for 
hypothesis two and indicate that investors did not pay attention to the true nature of earnings changes in the 
optimistic cycle. Table 4 also presents test results for pessimistic cycle. The coefficient is negative, but weakly 
significant, indicating although the sign of the coefficient presents support for hypothesis three, we do not find 
strong support for this hypothesis.  
 
Industry Effect 
 
In this section, we focus on optimistic cycle for which we found strong positive association between 
increases in discretionary accruals and stock returns, and test whether the industry membership was effective. Such 
an investigation will indicate whether industry membership was a significant factor in engaging in managing 
earnings in the optimistic cycle. This investigation is also beneficial as the degree of optimistic market environment 
can be different for different industries. To test the industry effect, we compute the following metric for each 
industry: 
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INDINDiIND nDACDAC /,
 
 
where INDDAC is the mean of discretionary accruals for each industry, DACi,IND is discretionary accruals for firm I 
in each industry, and nIND is number of the firms in each industry.  
 
The test results are presented in table 5.  
 
 
Table 5 
Earnings Management And Industry Membership 
Industry Samples IND
DAC
 T-value Sig. 
 
Basic Industries 115 1.149 1.086 .280 
Capital Goods 385 .073 3.537 .000 
Construction 44 .052 3.418 .001 
Consumer Goods 813 .178 1.810 .071 
Energy 110 .137 3.413 .001 
Finance  42 8.372 1.553 .128 
Total 1509 
 
 
Table 5 indicates that the discretionary accruals means are significant for four industries (capital goods, 
construction, consumer goods, and energy), except consumer goods which is significant at .1 level. However, the 
mean is not significant for basic industries and finance. The findings show that earnings management was not 
observed across industries alike. These findings suggest that market optimism may exist only in certain industries 
and that provides incentive for earnings management.  
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents evidence about the effect of stock market cycles on the association between earnings 
management and stock price returns. It shows when the stock market turns to an optimistic cycle, investors are 
affected by the general optimistic market environment and tend to ignore the nature of changes in earnings. In such 
an environment, investors are more receptive of the management ambitious business actions which may results in 
higher accruals. This situation presents ground for likelihood of engaging in earnings management. In addition, the 
market high performance in an optimistic cycle attracts more naive investors who may not be able to analyze the 
nature of changes in EPS and distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Our results show 
that one dollar increase in discretionary accruals resulted in fifteen cents increase in stock price return on average in 
the optimistic market cycle. On the other hand, our results show that investors were able to identify the effect of 
discretionary accruals on EPS changes in the neutral market environment and discount that effect in the stock prices. 
The test results showed that there was no association between increases in discretionary accruals and increases in 
stock prices in the neutral cycle. This could be due to lack of emotional decision making in this cycle and the 
existence of fewer naive investors in the market. On the other hand, our test results showed that investors may react 
negatively to increases in discretionary accruals in a pessimistic cycle. We found a negative relationship between 
increases in discretionary accruals and stock prices in that cycle. These findings suggest that when the market 
environment is generally negative, boosting EPS by increasing discretionary accruals will have a negative effect of 
investors’ valuation of stock prices. Our test results also show that the association between increases in discretionary 
accruals and increases in stock returns was not the same in different industries. This suggests that the optimistic 
cycle could be driven by factors which affect only certain industries.  
 
This study contributes to the growing literature on what factors may limit the firm’s ability to engage in 
earnings management. The findings presented in this study will help us to understand the process of engaging in 
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earnings management and the effect of market cycle on this process. Also, the results presented in this study may 
help researchers and financial analysts to understand the true nature of ratios such as P/E (price to EPS) and P/B 
(price to book value) in different market cycles. Our findings suggest that the time series analysis of P/E and P/B 
ratios without proper adjustment for the effect of market cycles on discretionary accruals may be biased and 
misleading.  
 
This study is limited in some aspects. We selected firms that had sufficient data in Compustat files. 
Although our sample is fairly large for statistical analyses, the effects of firms which are not listed in Compustat or 
did not have sufficient data are excluded. We also selected the total of fifteen quarters as optimistic, neutral and 
pessimistic cycles. Although those quarters reflected dramatic shifts in the selected time period which fairly 
represent the market cycles, the effect of larger cycles may or may not be consistent with our results. Also, we use 
the data the U.S. stock markets, which may or may not represent the effect of market cycles in other courtiers. These 
limitations present opportunities for future studies to extent this study.  
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